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Last Thursday, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan shocked many
with his announcement over Twitter that the ‘war is over’ for Emirati troops in Yemen, apparently
quoting Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash’s statements at a majlis meeting.
Interestingly, the Crown Prince allowed in his statement for the continued involvement of Emirati
troops in ‘counterterrorism operations’ inside Yemen. Indeed, despite the announcement,
Emirati troops remain guarding the airport and President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s palace in
Aden, where they also maintain a camp. One day after the Crown Prince’s Twitter statement,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash did an about-face, asserting that the Emiratis
‘are at war, and I am saddened that my comments have been misquoted and interpreted to
serve a foreign agenda that does not have good intentions toward the people of the region,
especially the people of the Gulf’.
Minister Gargash thus publicly corrected the most powerful political figure in the UAE, raising
serious questions about the unity of Emirati purpose in Yemen and Emirati commitment to the
Saudi-led war in that country. Gargash further assuaged fears of a breakdown of the Gulf
coalition in Yemen by insisting that the Emirati–Saudi relationship has been ‘reinforced by the
Yemen crisis’ and remains ‘essential for the future’. Mohammed bin Zayed, meanwhile, has
remained silent on the matter, suggesting that Gargash’s U-turn may reflect divisions inside the
Emirati establishment about the Yemen crisis. Examining possible causes of this internal
inconsistency, it seems likeliest that Emirati unease with Saudi cooperation with Muslim
Brotherhood affiliates inside Yemen is worrying portions of the Emirati leadership. Shaykh
Mohammed bin Zayed has been particularly outspoken in his criticism of the Muslim
Brotherhood and was instrumental in the most recent crackdown on the organisation inside the
UAE. It is thus unsurprising that he would find unpalatable the recent connections between
Saudi Arabia, which has also historically opposed Brotherhood influence within its borders, and
Brotherhood groups inside Yemen.
Domestic Emirati Discontent?
The timing of the Crown Prince’s initial statement is unlikely coincidental. Four Emirati pilots
died in two helicopter crashes the week before. These are by no means the first casualties in the
Yemen war; overall, more than 80 Emirati soldiers have been killed since they began operations
in Yemen in March 2015. In fact, 45 Emirati soldiers died on 5 September 2015, the deadliest day
in the country’s short military history.
Despite such losses, public outcry about military casualties, a very new problem for Gulf states,
has been muted, and not least due to the passage of more restrictive media laws that make
criticism of government policy nearly impossible. In the UAE, legislation passed in July 2015
tightened restrictions on media through the Anti-Discriminatory Law. The first person tried
under this law was, interestingly, a Saudi writer who criticised Emirati involvement in Yemen over
Twitter. In March 2016, an Omani man was sentenced to three years in prison in the UAE for
calling Emiratis who died in Yemen ‘cowards’ in Whatsapp messages on the charge of ‘ridiculing
and damaging the reputation of state symbols’. The state thus remains sensitive to domestic
complaint about ongoing involvement in the Yemen war, yet, for the most part, any domestic
discontent about the war remains muffled.
International criticism of the war appears to be increasing in recent weeks, however, and is more
likely to be influencing recent Emirati actions than any latent domestic discontent. Indeed, two
weeks ago, a United Nations report accused Saudi Arabia of youth civilian deaths inside Yemen,
leading to a blacklisting of the state that was quickly reversed. An April Human Rights Watch
report also criticised the GCC coalition for civilian deaths in Yemen. While such public
condemnation of the Yemen war is certainly relevant, the most likely explanation for the
inconsistent Emirati statements is the different tactics the Emiratis and Saudis have taken inside
Yemen, which are to a great extent informed by their views on the Muslim Brotherhood.
A Divided Coalition?
Saudi and Emirati divergent paths inside Yemen have been no secret. As Peter Salisbury
recounts in his latest Chatham House report, the UAE has increasingly come to focus its military
efforts on winning back Aden with the support of southern fighters before moving further
South, while Saudi troops have primarily supported fighters from the Mohsin and al-Ahmar
groups; it is unclear whether this was previously agreed upon as a strategy.
Further, after King Salman came to power in Saudi Arabia in January 2015, Saudi Arabia, looking
for partners inside Yemen, became more open to cooperating with Islamist, particularly Muslim
Brotherhood-linked groups, than did the UAE, which has long supported crackdown on the
group inside its borders. In fact, fighters in Taiz believed that they were being purposely
deprived of support from Emirati troops due to their purported affiliation with Islah, the Yemeni
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Certainly, Emirati troops were not involved in Taiz and have
instead been more active in aiding security and military forces in Aden, training large numbers
of Yemeni troops to help them protect themselves from Houthis and al-Qaida. In fact, some
Houthis have posited that Emirati drawdown could be a strategic decision after destruction of
Aden and recent deadly crashes killing Emirati troops.
Just a week prior to Shaykh al-Nahyan’s statement about the end of Emirati military operations,
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubair announced that Saudi Arabia had slowed its own military
operations inside Yemen, in anticipation of UN-sponsored peace talks, which are, notably, more
likely to lead to a ceasefire than to a political solution, explaining the continued need for Gulf
military presence in Yemen.
Significantly, the UAE-backed southern groups, along with the UAE itself, are not involved in the
peace talks, though these groups have helped to push out Houthi-Saleh groups from southern
Yemen last year. This lack of involvement indicates the UAE’s distancing from the process,
largely due to increasing dislike of the Hadi government, especially his vice president and
deputy commander of the armed forces Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, whom the UAE consider a
supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. Though the war has continued largely unchanged despite
recent official Emirati statements, the fact that they were publicly made reveals potential
divisions in purpose and tactics between the most powerful coalition partners inside Yemen. It
remains to be seen how exactly this disagreement will affect a potential peace agreement, which
it seems likely at present, Saudi leadership will dictate the outcome of.
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